

# Application of a Scientific Ethics Approach to Sport Decisions

EARLE F. ZEIGLER

Although philosophers have searched persistently throughout history for a normative ethical system on which people could and should base their conduct, there is still no single, non-controversial foundation on which the entire structure of ethics can be built. This paper recommends that a scientific ethics approach would be best for the present and the future. It is argued that initially we do not provide an adequate means whereby the young person can bridge the gap between an implicit, developing ethical sense and what will in maturity be regarded as a sounder, more explicit approach to the making of ethical decisions. The scientific ethics approach is applied to the amateur-professional controversy in sport as an example of how it could assist our evolving democratic society today.

Throughout existence the human animal has struggled for survival in a harsh physical environment. A recognizable semblance of victory has been won over difficult surroundings, but somehow we have not been able to remove the insecurity evident in our efforts to live together constructively and peacefully on our closed planet. In considering humankind's basic problems, Burt (1965) believes that

The greatest danger to his future lies in the disturbing emotions and destructive passions that he has not yet over-

come; the greatest promise lies in his capacity for a sensitive understanding of himself and his human fellows, and his power to enter the inclusive universe in which the creative aspirations of all can move freely toward their fulfillment. (p. 311)

Thus, if our "distorting emotions and destructive passions" do indeed represent the "greatest danger" for the future, the application of a sound ethical approach to personal and professional living can be of inestimable assistance to people who are truly seeking a "sensitive understanding" of themselves and their fellows.

Evidence that others see the need for study in ethics comes from a variety of sources. Recently *The*

---

*About the Author*

Earle F. Zeigler is with the Faculty of Physical Education at The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.

*New York Times* reported that "nowadays students in many disciplines are enrolling in new ethics courses in a variety of undergraduate departments and professional schools. . . . Part of the impetus for new programs stems from the social consciousness of the 1960s" ("The Growing Dishonesty," 1976). Whether this enrollment in ethics courses can be shown to have a relationship with the earlier social consciousness is an interesting question, but it is true that there has been a spate of indications that an interest in ethics is increasing. Some examples of this heightened interest are (a) Geoffrey Hazard's article on "Capitalist Ethics" (1978); (b) Henry Fairlie's book entitled *The Seven Deadly Sins Today* (1978); (c) James Chace's piece inquiring about "How 'Moral' Can We Get?" (1977); (d) Michael Blumenthal's statement that societal changes have occasioned "questionable and illegal corporate activities" (1977); (e) *The New York Times'* article inquiring whether the growing dishonesty in sports is just a reflection of our American society ("The Growing Dishonesty," 1976); (f) Derek Bok's request, as president of Harvard University, that courses in applied ethics be taught (1976); (g) Amitai Etzioni's assertion that "the hottest new item in post-Watergate curriculum is 'moral education'" (1976); (h) Gene Maeroff's review stressing that "West Point Cheaters Have a Lot of Company" (1976); (i) Russell Baker's spoof implying that "good sports went out with bamboo vaulting poles (1976); (j) Rainer Martens's belief that kid sports may currently be a "den of iniquity" (1976); (k) Ann Dennis's article explaining that the Canadian Sociol-

ogy and Anthropology Association is considering the adoption of a code of professional ethics (1975); (l) The *Saturday Review* Special Report entitled "Watergating on Main Street" that assessed the ethics of congressmen, lawyers, businessmen, accountants, journalists, doctors, and educators ("Watergating," 1975); and (m) Fred Hechinger's (1974) query as to "Whatever Became of Sin?"—to name just a few of the articles and statements that were readily apparent in a period of 18 months.

The term "ethics" is employed in three different ways, each of which has a relation to the other—and all of which will be used here. First, ethics classifies a general pattern or "way of life" (e.g., Muslim ethics). Second, it refers to a listing of rules of conduct, or what is often called a moral code (e.g., the "fair play" ethics of an athlete). Last, it describes an area of inquiry about ways of life or rules of conduct (e.g., that subdivision of philosophy now known as meta-ethics).

### Ethics Yesterday and Today

History substantiates that ethics is a description of "irregular progress toward complete clarification of each type of ethical judgment" (Abelson & Friquegnon, 1975, p. 82). By this is meant the "search for the meaning and standards of good in general, and of well-being, right conduct, moral character, and justice in particular." How does one judge exactly, or even generally, how much "irregular progress" has been made since the development of Greek ethics began in the fifth century B.C. One may argue that the changing political, economic, and other social forces of

that time required the introduction of a new way of conduct—just as today there appears to be an urgent need for altered standards of conduct during this evidently transitional period.

Today it would be an obvious exaggeration to say that there are as many approaches to ethics and/or moral philosophy as there are philosophers. Conversely, however, there is no single, noncontroversial foundation stone on which to build the entire structure of ethics. This is not to say that there are not some aspects of this branch of philosophy on which there has been fairly wide agreement. As Noel-Smith (1954) has explained, in the past moral philosophers offered general guidance as to what to do, what to seek, and how to treat others—injunctions that we could well keep in mind in the consideration of sport ethics.

As a rule philosophers have not tried to preach to their adherents in the same way as theologians have felt constrained to do. Nevertheless, many philosophers have offered practical advice that included pronouncements on what was good and bad or right and wrong. Still, many have persistently searched for a true moral code—a normative ethical system on which all people could and should base their conduct. The advent of philosophical analysis as a distinct approach during this century in the Western world has thrust the contemporary analytic philosopher right into the middle of the struggle between the ethical objectivist and the ethical subjectivist. The former asserts that the truth of that which is declared by an ethical statement is independent of that person, that particular time,

and that place where it is used. The subjectivist, on the other hand, argues that moral judgments about people or their actions are judgments about the way we think or feel about these people or their actions. However, at the very time when the world is in such a turmoil with “hot” wars, cold wars, terrorists—at the very time when people of all ages want to know about “what to do, what to seek, and how to treat others”—the large majority of scholars in the field of philosophy are almost completely silent, avoiding the rational justification of any type of moral system and analyzing the meaning and function of moral concepts and statements only occasionally.

What we find, therefore, is that the dispensing of “ethical wisdom” in life is generally left to people who have given the topic much less scholarly thought than those related professionally to the discipline of philosophy. What we have as a result is a situation where theologians, dramatists, novelists, poets, medical doctors, politicians, sport figures, educational administrators—in no special order of importance—offer a variety of opinions from suggestions to dogma about all aspects of life including sports and games. Most notable among these amateur philosophers are scientists and comedians—people who may have earned justifiable fame, or even notoriety. I believe strongly that at least part of the professional output of sport and physical education philosophers ought to be directed pointedly at what might be called the lay public and also to their colleagues in educational circles.

All of us should be working toward the elimination of irrational

ethical beliefs while attempting to discover the soundest possible ethical system for *our* evolving society. We recognize that the task of normative inquiry can be most difficult, especially when complex issues and conclusions tend to stray into the realm of meta-ethics. The person in the mother discipline of philosophy, the educational philosopher, and the sport and physical activity philosopher must assist the profession if we ever hope to be able to justify ethical theory in competitive sport. Such justification demands that the theorist state correctly, elucidate sufficiently, and defend adequately his/her moral or ethical claims and arguments about participation in competitive sport.

### **The Person's Implicit "Sense of Life"**

How does a child's personality develop prior to the time when a young person gets a chance in our society to learn through education how to make ethical decisions in life? Rand (1960) offers an interesting analysis of what occurs in the life of a young person before any semblance of a rational philosophy develops. The human possesses a "psychological recorder" which is the integrating mechanism of a person's subconscious. This so-called sense of life "is a pre-conceptual equivalent of metaphysics, an emotional, subconsciously integrated appraisal of man and existence. It sets the nature of a man's emotional responses and the essence of his character" (p. 31). This human being is making choices, is forming value judgments, is experiencing emotions, and in a great many ways is acquiring an *implicit* view of life. All of this young

person's conclusions or evasions about or from life represent an implicit metaphysics.

As people interested in the entire educational process, our hope is that all young people will have the chance to develop their rational powers. If this occurs, reason can then act as the programmer of the individual's "emotional computer" with a possible outcome that the earlier sense of life will develop into a reasonable logical philosophy. If the maturing child does not have the opportunity to develop rationality, or evades the opportunity, then unfortunately chance takes over. Thus we have a person who has matured chronologically, but who is "integrating blindly, incongruously, and at random" (Rand, 1960, p. 33). How important is it, for example, that in the development of a fully integrated personality the young person's sense of life matches conscious, rationalized convictions? What can the role of philosophy be—what *should* it be—in the formation of a fully integrated personality? Is not the goal of education an individual whose mind and emotions are in harmony, thereby enabling the person to develop to full potential and achieve maximum effectiveness in life?

Further, because a person is a social animal and because physical activity—often including sports and games—is typically part of everyone's life, we should give careful consideration to the problem of helping the young person to bridge the gap from an early sense of life with its embryonic, amorphous value integrations to the making of ethical decisions in sport and similar types of physical activity. We should be helping that

person—the intramural or varsity athlete often involved in highly competitive situations charged with strong emotions—to develop conscious convictions in which the mind leads and the emotions follow to the greatest possible extent. It is at this point also where wise educational leadership can by example and precept serve as the best possible guide for the young person often confronted with difficult ethical decisions involving both speech and conduct.

### **Major Ethical "Routes" Available in the Western World**

Having arrived at this point—a position where we have stated that a young person in our society should be so educated that there is an opportunity to develop rationality as a "life competency"—we now need to ask ourselves what major, alternative ethical routes are available for our use in the Western world. We can all agree that we want to assist the young person to bridge this gap. Further, we would expect that the opportunity to achieve such comprehension within reasonable limits would be readily available to all aspiring young people in North American life today. Unfortunately, I am forced to state that nothing is farther from the truth based on my experience with young people over a period of years. I am forced to agree with Rand's earlier assertion that on all sides we find young people "integrating blindly, incongruously, and at random" about all aspects of life. No matter whether the question is one of taking drugs for presumably heightened experiences, or cheating on examinations or term papers, or breaking the

rules in competitive sport in one or more of a dozen overt or covert ways, the evidence points to an upbringing in which the young person has not received educational experiences in which an "ethical competency" could be developed.

Keeping all of the above factors in mind, I set out to determine what major ethical routes of a philosophical nature are available to the physical educator/coach today. A careful analysis of these approaches indicates great variation in terminology and emphases. Terms that appear include ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism (or intuitionism), and emotivism (Hospers, 1953, p. 485); authoritarianism, relativism, and scientific ethics (Fromm, 1967, p. 37); the legalistic, the antinomian, and the situational (Fletcher, 1966, pp. 17-18); and religious absolutism, conventionalism, rational absolutism, and utilitarian relativism (Abelson & Friquegnon, 1975). Further, Titus and Keeton (1973, pp. 59-60) use a threefold classification, but they do their best to avoid an "ism" nomenclature by stating that there are (a) those who live under the aegis of codes (e.g., God's word); (b) those who thrust aside codes and prescribed laws; and (c) those who seek to establish ethical norms through the application of reflective moral judgment. Finally, Patterson (1957) states that we can delineate correctly two divisional categories of ethical theories—where the knowledge comes from and the motive that prompts action. To add to this review of what might be called secondary listings, pertinent work of a primary nature was examined as follows: John Dewey (1929, 1946, 1948; Dewey & Tufts, 1932); G. E. Moore (1948);

Simone de Beauvoir (1964); A. J. Ayer (1946); C. L. Stevenson (1947-48); Joseph Fletcher (1966); Kurt Baier (1958); and John Rawls (1971).

As a result of this analysis, five presumably different approaches have been subsumed in Table 1. Each approach or "ethical route" has been described according to (a) underlying presupposition, (b) criterion for evaluation, (c) method for determination of ethical decision, and (d) probable result. The five ethical theories or routes are as follows: (a) authoritarianism (or legalism); (b) relativism (or antinomianism); (c) situationism; (d) scientific ethics; and (e) emotivism. No strong argument is being made here for five approaches as opposed to two, three, or four. This analysis represents only what might be called a consensual tabulation.

### **Underlying Rationale for Scientific Ethics Approach**

My plan at this time—keeping space limitations in mind—must simply be one in which a brief discussion is presented as to why the application of scientific method to ethical analysis seems necessary at present. Men and women today are finding themselves in an unusually difficult position. All of us are discovering that there is indeed a "crisis of human values" in existence, and the confidence that we had previously in religion and philosophy has been seriously undermined. Daily we hear on the one hand that onrushing science and technology are our great benefactors. Then in the next moment we learn that science and technology may actually destroy life on this planet permanently—at least in the

sense that we have known it to this point ("God and Science," 1977).

Further, we have learned that the twentieth century is a transitional one—that the old order has most definitely been replaced by the new! But what is not generally appreciated is that the *rate* of change in society is gradually accelerating and that this acceleration will continue to increase. All of this has led me to conclude that in the Western world we must eliminate the persisting dualism that has separated investigation about the physical world from the study of human behavior in relation to moral values and virtues. In an evolving democratic society, I cannot personally find a strong rationale for any authoritarian or legalistic doctrine governing ethical behavior—one in which ironclad conformity is required because of the presence of absolute good and rightness in the world. Such an assumption is a personal one on my part, of course. It is fortunate for me that our society guarantees individual freedom in such matters as long as the laws of the land are not abrogated.

I have considered the antinomial, relativistic position as well. As pleasant as it may be on occasion to rebel against society in a radical manner, antinomianism appears to be so far to the left on an authoritarian-anarchistic freedom spectrum as to be fundamentally "out of key" in a democracy. Despite the appeal of the emotivist approach and the logic of the language analyst, it is my position that society's present plight requires more than the application of this technique alone to life's many ethical problems. I believe that our failure to employ scientific method in the realm of so-called *moral* goods, as

**Table 1**  
**Major Philosophical Approaches to Ethical Decisions**

Ethical approach	Underlying presupposition	Criterion for evaluation	Method for determination of ethical decision	Probable result
I. Authoritarianism (or legalism)	Absolute good and rightness are either present in the world or have been determined by custom, law, or code.	Conformity to rules, laws, moral codes, established systems and customs.	Application of normative standard (or law) to resolve the ethical dilemma or issue.	<i>The</i> solution to any ethical dilemma can be readily determined and then implemented (acted upon).
II. Relativism (or antinomianism)	Good and bad, and rightness and wrongness, are <i>relative</i> and vary according to the situation or culture involved.	Needs of situation <i>there</i> and <i>then</i> in culture or society concerned.	Guidance in the making of an ethical decision may come either from "outside," intuition, one's own conscience, empirical investigation, reason, etc.	Each ethical decision is highly individual since every situation has its particularity; there are <i>no</i> absolutely valid principles or universal laws.
III. Situationism (with certain similarity to #1 above)	God's love (or some other <i>summum bonum</i> ) is an absolute norm; reason, revelation, and precedent have no objective normative status.	"What is fitting" in the situation is based on application of <i>agapeic love</i> ; subordinate moral principles serve to illuminate the situation.	Resolution of ethical dilemma results from use of calculating method plus contextual appropriateness; act from <i>loving concern</i> ; what is benevolent is right.	The best solution, everything considered, will result when the principle of God's love is applied situationally.

Table 1 (continued)

Ethical approach	Underlying presupposition	Criterion for evaluation	Method for determination of ethical decision	Probable result
IV. Scientific ethics (scientific method applied to ethics)	No distinction between <i>moral</i> goods and <i>natural</i> goods; science can bring about complete agreement on factual belief about human behavior.	Ideas helpful in solving problematic situations are therefore true; empirical verification of hypothesis brings theory and practice union.	Use of scientific method in problem-solving; <i>reflective thinking</i> begets ideas that function as tentative solutions for concrete problems; test hypotheses experimentally.	Agreement in factual belief will soon result in agreement in attitude; <i>continuous adaptation</i> of values to the culture's changing needs will effect the directed reconstruction of all social institutions.
V. Emotivism (analytic philosophy's response to problems of ethics)	Ethics is normative (i.e., moral <i>standards</i> ) and therefore cannot be a science; the term "good" appears to be indefinable.	An ethical dispute must be on a factual level; <i>value</i> statements must be distinguished from factual ones.	Involves logical analysis of ethical (normative standard) terms; factual statements referred to social scientists; analyze conflicting attitudes to determine progress.	Ethical dilemmas can be resolved through the combined efforts of the moralist <i>and</i> the scientist; common beliefs may in time change attitudes.



well as in the realm of so-called *natural goods*, keeps our world in a position where changes in values have come about accidentally or arbitrarily. Social theory has warned us continually about the powerful, controlling influence of societal values and norms. If in the near future we are only able to obliterate the idea that there is a difference *in kind* between what we have called "human nature" and what we have identified as the "physical world," we will then be able to bring the forces of science to bear more effectively on *all* human behavior. What we need, therefore,

is intelligent examination of the consequences that are actually effected by inherited institutions and customs, in order that there may be intelligent consideration of the ways in which they are to be intentionally modified in behalf of generation of different consequences. (Dewey, 1929, p. 273)

We need a faith that (a) science can indeed bring about complete agreement on *factual belief* about human behavior; (b) such agreement in factual belief will soon result in agreement in *attitudes* held by people; and (c) resultantly a continuous adaptation of values to the culture's changing needs will eventually effect the directed reconstruction of all social institutions (Dewey, 1948, p. xxiii).

I wish to explain further that placing our faith in scientific method in no way negates the work of the analytic philosopher who subscribes to the language analysis phase of the emotivist approach. Such analytic endeavor is actually scientific

and can assist science in a vital way by dispensing with fallacious premises and nonsense terms so that hypotheses will be stated correctly and understood as completely as possible. However, it is at this point that a wholly scientific approach to ethics parts company with emotivism, because the problematic *factual* statements are not automatically referred to the social scientist. Indeed, the distinction between the so-called factual statements and the so-called value statements is not made in the scientific ethics approach—it is *explicitly rejected!*

With this approach the scientific method itself is brought to bear in problem solving. Reflective thinking begets the ideas that function as tentative solutions for concrete problems of *all* kinds. In the process a rapidly changing culture confronts the person who, as a problem-solving organism, must be prepared to make adjustments. Habitual and/or impulsive responses will often not be effective—and assuredly not as effective as reflective thinking that employs both the experience of the past *and* the introduction of creative ideas. Thus, as explained by Albert, Denise, and Peterfreund (1975), the "criterion of truth is directly related to the outcome of the reflective process. Those ideas which are successful in resolving problematic situations are true, whereas those which do not lead to satisfactory adjustments are false" (p. 282). Viewed in this manner, we can appreciate what James called the "cash value" of an idea—the import that certain knowledge, having served as an instrument for verification for people, has for the fulfillment of human purpose.

### An Application of Scientific Method to Ethical Analysis

At present when we encounter ethical problems in our lives, be they personal problems, work problems, or in situations relating to competitive sport—and assuming that we recognize that a problem is an ethical problem—we seem to be resolving any such issue on the basis of either authoritarianism, relativism, or perhaps on the basis of what might be called “common sense, cultural utilitarianism.” One would feel somewhat more secure if only Fletcher’s (1966) situationism embodying the principle of “God’s love” were employed. How much better would it be, however, if we would avail ourselves of the opportunity to expand the mind’s potential toward its true capability by using the experimental method for the solving of problems? Based on such a theory of knowledge—where the mind serves to form knowledge or truth by undergoing experience—we would have an approach that could be regularly employed with a much better chance of success.

Let us now follow this postulation with a series of theoretical steps that would be involved in the application of this approach to one persistent, truly vexing problem in competitive sport—the amateur-professional controversy. The steps followed in this experimental approach would be as follows:

1. *Theory—Step 1.* The smoothness of life’s movement or flow is interrupted by an obstacle. This obstacle creates a problem, and the resultant tension must be resolved to allow further movement (progress?) to take place.
2. *Theory—Step 2.* Humankind marshals all available and presumably pertinent facts to help with the solution of this problem. Data gathered tends to fall into one or more patterns. Subsequent analysis offers the possibility of various alternatives for action, *one of which should be chosen as a working hypothesis.* First, the basic terms or concepts were defined carefully and then placed in a traditional play-work definitional diagram as applied to sport and physical activity. Differentiation was made among synthetic, analytic, and pseudo-statements. Second, the status and a brief background of sport/athletics in North America were reviewed (with emphasis on the university level). Third, the possible relationship among the prevailing, pivotal social forces and the status of sport was considered. The differences in the interpretation of the various concepts in the three leading types of political state—democracy, communism, and aristocracy—were explained. It was

Here we are faced with the problem (obstacle) that the concepts of “work” and “play” are typically strongly dichotomized in North America, and their usage is imprecise and muddled. Nowhere is the confusion (tension) more evident than when we are determining to what extent the nomenclature of “work” and “play” may be applied when dealing with the various levels of sport participation. This describes what may be called the “amateur-professional controversy”—a problem or obstacle that has been with humankind since ancient times.

explained further why and how the terms "work" and "play" have become so sharply dichotomized. Still further, it became apparent that a need exists for reevaluation of some of our basic assumptions about the amateur code in sport. It was pointed out that the so-called professional in sport today is being professional in only a very limited sense of the word. There is typically no commitment as a true professional whose primary aim in life is to serve others through lifelong service. The argument was made that the amateur should be regarded as the beginner—not as the Olympic performer who somehow refrained from taking cash (but who has somehow received all kinds of comparable support along the way). Fourth, as a

result of the investigation described above, one alternative (*hypothesis*) was selected from the various courses of action open on the basis of the type of political state being considered (a democracy). Proceeding from this hypothesis, a *model* was recommended—one in which the concepts of "work" and "play" are altered, and one in which insurmountable problems do not arise in an evolving democracy. The model was entitled "Aspects of a Person's 'Active Occupation,'" with work, play, and art included as the three appropriate aspects. These terms were related from the standpoint of a concept of the "unified organism" (see Figure 1).

3. *Theory—Step 3.* The *hypothesis* must be tested through the ap-




Figure 1. Aspects of a Person's "Active Occupation." (Play, Art, and Work.)

plication of the *model* developed to test its suitability. If one hypothesis does not solve the problem for our society, then another should be tried. A hypothesis that works—in the sense that it gradually achieves recognition as being fair and equitable—thereby turns out to be true. It offers a framework for organizing facts, and this will result subsequently in a central meaning that may then be called knowledge.

4. *Theory—Step 4.* The final step in this scientific approach to the resolution of sport decisions that are ethical in nature relates to acceptance of the working hypothesis as evidenced by changing attitudes on the part of the general public. The assumption is that determination of knowledge based on agreement in factual belief that is communicated to citizens in an evolving democracy should soon result in agreement in attitude. Admittedly, sociological progress is never a “straight-line affair,” but continuous adaptation of values to the culture’s changing needs should effect the directed reconstruction of all social institutions.

It is at this point that experimentalistic theory of knowledge acquisition merges with the value theory of scientific ethics. Knowledge acquired frees all people to initiate subsequent action furthering the process of movement and change indefinitely into the future (as adapted from Zeigler, 1964, pp. 72-74).

I believe that there is logic in a bonafide progression—if the person wishes to progress and is suffi-

ciently capable—through the ranks of the amateur athlete to that of the semipro, and finally to that of the highly trained, proficient athletic performer. Such a person becomes a professional in at least one sense of the term. Based on the model employed, if a boy plays baseball after school (for example), his goals are short range and therefore conceived as “play.” If he continues with his interest in high school and college and were to receive an athletic scholarship to attend college, play might soon take on many of the aspects of what we now call “work.” Thus when the young man (and now it might be a young woman, too) goes away to college on an athletic scholarship, he may then be considered a semipro. This is logical because of the time being spent, because of the middle range goals attached to his athletic activity, and because of the level of performance he has achieved—*as well as* the fact that he was being paid an amount of money for performing the baseball skills he has mastered. If the young man is then chosen in a draft by the major leagues, he will then be forced to make a decision on Level II, the Goals Continuum, about moving on to the far right of the continuums at Levels II, III, and IV. Further, as shown at Level I (Categories of Interest), the same approach would hold for all aspects of a person’s “active occupation.”

### Concluding Statement

We can all grant that these seem to be truly unusual times, that a world transformation is taking place, and that it is occurring rapidly because the tempo of civilization

appears to be increasing exponentially. We are told that the "dialogue of freedom" may go on indefinitely, but the "solutions to our problems are not primarily ideological but structural. . . . They constitute a new political direction in the world—not left or right as in the past—but human and forward" (Platt, 1972, pp. 21-22). It is this type of reasoning that has rekindled my interest in the abolition of the longstanding, but probably unwise, distinction between what we in the past have called *moral* and *natural* goods.

We are exhorted further to prepare for a continuing technological thrust, and also told that "the only indispensable human component is the mind component for design, redesign, complex evaluation, and control" (Platt, 1972, p. 26). If these predictions have any validity, then as Platt states, "Yet millions of the older generation, alternately disgusted and terrified by these developments, will have to learn new values and a new language" (p. 26).

In this same vein, Callahan (1972) writes about searching for an ethic in a new culture that is on its way here, but that still does not yet exist. My general conclusion is that the scientific ethics approach, embodying careful application of language analysis at all appropriate points, offers the best and ultimately the most humane approach to the problematic situation our culture is now facing—that of new and continually changing values that will bring about a new and continually changing culture. Whether we are facing ethical decisions in our home life, our professional endeavor, or even in our competitive sport pursuits whether they be amateur, semiprofessional, or professional, this approach offers

everyone not a philosophy of life, but an explicit approach to philosophical understanding—a philosophy for the living of life today and tomorrow.

#### REFERENCES

- Abelson, R., & Friquegnon, M. *Ethics for modern life*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.
- Albert, E.M., Denise, T.C., & Peterfreund, S.P. *Great traditions in ethics* (3rd ed.). New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1975.
- Ayer, A.J. *Language, truth and logic* (Rev. ed.). New York: Dover Publications, 1946.
- Baier, K. *The moral point of view*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958.
- Baker, R. Good bad sports. *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 1, 1976.
- de Beauvoir, S. *The ethics of ambiguity*. New York: Citadel Press, 1964.
- Blumenthal, W.M. Business morality has not deteriorated—society has changed. *The New York Times* (Business & Finance), January 9, 1977.
- Bok, D.C. Can ethics be taught? *Change*, 1976, 8(9), 26-30.
- Burt, E.A. *In search of philosophic understanding*. New York: New American Library, 1965.
- Callahan, D. Search for an ethic: Living with the new biology. *The Center Magazine*, July/August 1972, pp. 4-12.
- Chace, J. How "moral" can we get? *The New York Times Magazine*, May 22, 1977, pp. 38-40.
- Dennis, A.B. A code of ethics for sociologists and anthropologists? *Social Sciences in Canada*, 1975, 3 (1-2), 14-16.
- Dewey, J. *The quest for certainty*. New York: Minton Balch, 1929.
- Dewey, J. *Problems of men*. New York: Holt, 1946.
- Dewey, J. *Reconstruction in philosophy*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948.
- Dewey, J., & Tufts, J.H. *Ethics* (Rev. ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1932.
- Etzioni, A. Do as I say, not as I do. *The New York Times Magazine*, September 26, 1976, pp. 44-45.
- Fairlie, H. *The seven deadly sins today*. Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1978.
- Fletcher, J. *Situation ethics: The new morality*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966.
- Fromm, E. *Man for himself*. New York: Fawcett World Library, 1967.

- God and science—New allies in the search for values. *Saturday Review Special Report*, December 10, 1977, pp. 13-43.
- The growing dishonesty in sports: Is it just a reflection of our American society? *The New York Times* (Sports Section), November 7, 1976, p. 10.
- Hazard, G.C., Jr. Capitalist ethics. *Yale Alumni Magazine & Journal*, 1978, 41 (8), 50-51.
- Hechinger, F.M. Whatever became of sin? *Saturday Review World*, September 21, 1974, pp. 48-49.
- Hospers, J. *An introduction to philosophical analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1953.
- Maeroff, G.I. West Point cheaters have a lot of company. *The New York Times* (Review Section), June 20, 1976.
- Martens, R. Kid sports: A den of iniquity or a land of promise? *Proceedings, 79th Annual Meeting, National College Physical Education Association for Men*, 1976, 102-112.
- Moore, G.E. *Principia ethica*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1948.
- Noel-Smith, P.H. *Ethics*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954.
- Patterson, C.H. *Moral standards: An introduction to ethics*. New York: Ronald Press, 1957.
- Platt, J. What's ahead for 1990? *The Center Magazine*, July/August 1972, pp. 21-28.
- Rand, A. *The romantic manifesto*. New York: World Publishing, 1960.
- Rawls, J. *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Stevenson, C.L. The nature of ethical disagreement. *Sigma*, 1947-48, 1-2, 8-9.
- Titus, H.H., & Keeton, M. *Ethics for today* (5th ed.). New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1973.
- Watergating on main street. *Saturday Review Special Report*, November 1, 1975, pp. 10-28.
- Zeigler, E.F. *Philosophical foundations for physical, health, and recreation education*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.